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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
BRIAN CECIL MANGUM, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20010185-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Defendant appeals his conviction of possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann § 58-37-8 
(1998 & Supp. 2001), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5, (1998) in the Third District Court, West Valley 
Department, the Honorable Terry Christiansen presiding. This Court has jurisdiction 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996 & Supp. 2001). 
ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue: Was defendant's trial counsel ineffective for failing to call a witness who 
defendant contends would have buttressed his claim that he was unaware of the presence 
of the drugs found in the car he was driving? 
Standard of Review: A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel raised for the 
first time on appeal is reviewed de novo. Fernandez v. Cook, 870 P.2d 870, 873-74 (Utah 
1993). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
This case involves no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was arrested on July 20, 2001, after deputy sheriffs discovered a small 
pouch containing methamphetamine, baggies and a pipe used for smoking "crystal meth" 
in the Corvette he was driving (R. 98:35, 94, 99). 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance with 
intent to distribute and possession of drug paraphernalia (R. 1-2). 
Following a preliminary hearing on October 24, 2000, defendant was bound over 
for trial on both counts (R. 100:52). 
Following a two-day jury trial on November 27-28, 2000, defendant was convicted 
on both counts (R. 99:338). He was sentenced to 1-15 years at the Utah State Prison (R. 
84). He timely appeals (R. 85). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS1 
A Case of Bad Timing 
According to defense witnesses, Brian Mangum was in the wrong place at the 
wrong time. He was driving a borrowed car, and the methamphetamine, measuring 
scales, baggies and meth pipe shenff s deputies discovered inside the vehicle all belonged 
to someone else. In fact, all the incriminating evidence must have been in the car when 
defendant picked it up about an hour earlier to test dnve it for a friend's sister who was 
considering purchasing it (R. 99*239-40). 
Where did the drugs come from? Witnesses for the defendant testified that the 
drugs and paraphernalia were left behind by a mysterious drug dealer who, on the 
previous day, hitched a nde bnefly in the car and somehow managed to leave all the tools 
and trappings of his trade in the front and back seat of the Corvette (R. 99.248-59, R. 
100.31,35). 
Plainly, some details of defendant's story did not jibe with the evidence. For 
instance, some of the items - the baggy and the meth pipe - were in plain view, thus 
belying defendant's implication that the drugs were in the car when he picked it up and 
that he was unaware of them (R. 98.94, 99)2 Moreover, deputies testified that the broken 
1
 "On appeal, the facts are recited in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict " 
State v Bradley, 972 P 2d 78, 79 (Utah App 1998) (internal quotations and citation 
omitted). 
2
 Defendant did not testify at his tnal, so the details of his "story" are unclear 
However, the tnal transcnpt makes clear that this was his position. 
3 
meth pipe in the in the back seat was covered with what appeared to be fresh blood from a 
cut on defendant's finger. There was also blood spattered on the passenger side window, 
which deputies interpreted to mean that when defendant realized he was being pulled 
over, he grabbed the pipe, accidentally cut himself, then left a trail of blood when he 
attempted to conceal it in the back seat (R. 98:94, 96-97). 
Ultimately, jurors were not persuaded by defendant's story. They convicted him 
on both counts (R. 99:338). 
The Arrest 
Defendant's misadventure with law enforcement began during the early morning 
hours of July 21, 2001 (R. 98:46, 49). Salt Lake County Sheriffs Detective Tom 
Regennitter was looking for defendant in connection with an auto theft (R. 98:49). 
Detective Regennitter was near defendant's home in West Jordan and observed someone 
pull away from the home in a black Corvette (R. 98:48). Detective Regennitter attempted 
to overtake the vehicle, but his unmarked Ford Taurus was no match for the Corvette, so 
he radioed for assistance from other sheriffs deputies in the area (id.). 
Shortly thereafter, Deputy Michael Smith stopped the Corvette for having an 
expired license plate (R. 98:93-94, 99). As he approached the car, Detective Smith 
noticed a zip-lock baggy on the passenger seat and a ''crystal meth pipe" in the back seat 
of the car (R. 98:94, 99). He also noticed that defendant had cut one of the fingers on his 
right hand and blood was spattered on the passenger side window creating trail to the 
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back seat (R. 98:96). Upon closer inspection, he found that the tip of the glass pipe was 
crushed and that the broken edges were also stained with fresh blood (R. 98:97-98). 
Detective Smith placed defendant under arrest (R. 98:98). A search of the vehicle 
revealed a fanny pack under the front passenger seat containing three or four grams of 
methamphetamine, a scale (the likes of which are often used for measuring drugs), small 
baggies (often used for packaging drugs), a butane lighter and $2,000 in cash (R. 98:35). 
The Preliminary Hearing 
At the preliminary hearing, defendant called a single witness, Brandy Nelson (R. 
100:26). Ms. Nelson stated that she and her boyfriend, whom she identified as John 
Martilis, received a ride from her cousin's girlfriend, Maria Coy (R. 100:29). She said 
Ms. Coy picked up the two of them in a black Corvette (R. 100:29-30). 
Ms. Nelson stated that she and her boyfriend started arguing and that, at one point, 
he climbed into the back seat and began choking her (R. 100:33). Ms. Nelson also stated 
that John had been abusive toward her in the past and that she believed it was due to 
drugs (R. 100:30). 
She stated that he carried a "black little hip sack" with him and she believed he 
kept drugs in it (id.). She stated that during the altercation with Martilis, she pushed the 
bag underneath the front passenger seat (R. 100:34). Although she stated that she 
believed she could recognize the bag if she saw it again, she was not asked to do so 
during the hearing (R. 100:34). 
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Ms. Nelson also testified that after Ms. Coy dropped off the two of them, Martilis 
realized he had lost his bag (R. 100:35). Thinking he had probably left it in the Corvette, 
he instructed Ms. Nelson to contact Ms. Coy and retrieve it (id.). 
Trial 
At trial, defendant did not call Ms. Nelson, but instead called Ms. Coy as his only 
witness (R. 99:236). Ms. Coy testified that in July 2000, she was considering buying a 
black Corvette from a woman named Kathy Barnes, who loaned her the car for several 
days so she could decide if she liked it (R. 99:237).3 Because the car had some 
mechanical problems, Ms. Coy decided to have someone inspect it (R. 99:239). Her 
brother suggested that defendant inspect the car (R. 99:240). She testified that defendant 
picked up the Corvette about 11 p.m. on July 20, 2000 (R. 99:240-41). 
Ms. Coy recalled her meeting with Ms. Nelson and "John." She testified that her 
former boyfriend had asked her to give his cousin, Ms. Nelson, a ride, and she agreed (R. 
99:245). However, she regretted her decision when, soon after she picked them up, Ms. 
Nelson and John began to argue (R. 99:248). After driving a short distance, she decided 
she was tired of their behavior and dropped them off (id.). 
Ms. Coy also testified that John was wearing a black fanny pack, which she said 
resembled the pack police found in the Corvette when defendant was arrested (id.). 
3These statements are contradicted by the testimony of Detective Regennitter, who 
stated that he had received a phone call from a Kathy "Burns" who told him that 
defendant was purchasing the car from her (R. 98:77). 
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However, she said she did not recall seeing the pack in the car after she dropped off the 
couple (R. 99:249). Nor did she recall seeing the baggies or the crystal meth pipe 
deputies found in the car (R. 99:264). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I: To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant is 
required to provide sufficient factual support to overcome the strong presumption in favor 
of reasonable professional assistance. Instead, defendant only speculates that trial 
counsel could have had no good reason not to call Ms. Nelson at trial. Defendant's 
ineffectiveness claim, thus, is not supported on the existing record. 
Point II: Comparing trial counsel's performance to an "objective standard of 
reasonableness" demonstrates that his performance was not only effective, but superior. 
Although his reasons for not calling Ms. Nelson are unknown, there are several plausible 
strategic advantages for calling Ms. Coy instead. Thus, defendant has not overcome the 
strong presumption in favor of a finding of reasonable professional assistance. 
Point III: Even if defendant had provided an adequate record to support his claim 
and demonstrated that trial counsel's performance was substandard, he still cannot show 
prejudice. First, it is unlikely that any additional information Ms. Nelson could have 
provided concerning the owner of the pack would have added significantly to the legal 
theory defendant was advancing, i.e., that the pack did not belong to him. Second, Ms. 
Nelson's testimony would have done nothing to explain the presence of the other items in 
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the car - the baggies, the broken (and bloodied) meth pipe or the fact that defendant was 
carrying $2,000 in cash. Thus, even if failure to call Ms. Nelson as a witness was deemed 
ineffective, the error created no prejudice to defendant. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective because he did not call Brandy 
Nelson to testify at his trial. This failure, defendant avers, constitutes ineffective 
assistance because Ms. Nelson's testimony "would have immeasurably strengthened the 
constructive possession defense advanced at trial." Br. Aplt. at 10. 
A defendant claiming ineffective assistance of counsel must identify acts or 
omissions demonstrating that his trial counsel's performance did not meet "an objective 
standard of reasonableness." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 690 
(1984). A defendant must also show that "there is a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsels]' unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993) ("A 
reasonable probability is that which is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the 
reliability of the outcome"). Finally, proof of counsel's ineffectiveness "must be a 
demonstrable reality, not mere speculation." Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254 
As shown below, defendant meets none of these requirements. Accordingly, his 
conviction should be affirmed and his appeal dismissed. 
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I. DEFENDANT'S CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE MUST BE REJECTED AS 
SPECULATIVE. 
In support of his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant offers 
nothing but speculation and conjecture. For this reason alone, defendant's claim must 
fail. "On many occasions, this court has reiterated that proof of ineffective assistance of 
counsel cannot be a speculative matter but must be a demonstrable reality." Fernandez v 
Cook, 870 P 2d 870, 877 (Utah 1993). Defendant asserts that his tnal counsel must be 
deemed ineffective because he did not call a certain witness to testify. In effect, 
defendant argues that, for lack of an explanation as to why tnal counsel did not call Ms. 
Nelson to testify, this Court must presume that he had no good reason for his choice. 
However, defendant does not get the benefit of such a presumption. In fact, the opposite 
is true: "[Tjhere is a strong presumption that counsel's performance was 'within the wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Tyler, 850 P.2d at 1254. It is incumbent on 
defendant to rebut this presumption with facts, not speculation. Id. Because defendant 
has done nothing but tout the importance of Ms Nelson's testimony and then insinuate 
that tnal counsel could have no good reason not to call her, he has not even begun to meet 
his burden. For this reason alone, defendant's appeal should be dismissed. 
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II. DEFENDANT HAS NOT AND CANNOT SHOW THAT 
HIS TRIAL COUNSEL'S REPRESENTATION FELL 
BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF 
REASONABLENESS. 
In examining a claim of ineffectiveness, an appellate court "will not substitute its 
judgment for that of counsel regarding matters of trial strategy, nor will it assess counsel's 
competence with the benefit of hindsight." People v. Rockey, 601 N.W.2d 887, 890 
(Mich. App. 1999). As the Utah Supreme Court has stated, "[t]he calling of witnesses is 
a matter of judgment on the part of a lawyer. . . . A lawyer is not incompetent simply 
because she does not call all witnesses desired by her client." Batchelor v. Smith, 555 
P.2d 871, 872 (Utah 1976). Moreover, "there is a strong presumption that counsel's 
performance was 'within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" Tyler, 
850 P.2d at 1254 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted). 
With a presumption of reasonableness as a yardstick, the performance of 
defendant's tnal counsel is shown to be not simply adequate, but superior. As defendant 
notes, the appropriate trial strategy was clearly to claim that he had no knowledge of the 
presence of the drugs in the vehicle. To that end, tnal counsel offered the testimony of 
Maria Coy, who told the jury that she was considering purchasing the Corvette and that 
defendant had borrowed it to determine if it was mechanically sound (R. 99:239-40). Ms. 
Coy also testified about the odd encounter with Ms. Nelson and a man identified as 
4
*John" both of whom she met briefly when she gave them a ride in the Corvette (R. 
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99:248). Ms. Coy recalled that John was carrying a fanny pack that resembled the bag 
containing the drugs which deputies was discovered in the Corvette (R. 99:248-49). 
Nonetheless, defendant claims that Ms. Nelson's testimony was crucial because it 
would provide "specific details about he ownership and ultimate disposition of the fanny 
pack . . . " and that she "would have testified that the fanny pack belonged to her 
boyfriend . . ." Br. Aplt. at 6, 10. Defendant continues: 
By not calling Brandy [Nelson] to testify at trial, the jury was 
left with a story devoid of essential detail. Maria [Coy] did 
not know the full names of the people in her car, nor could 
she say what happened to the fanny pack. She did not know if 
the pack had been left in the car or was taken away. Brandy's 
testimony would have completed the story, not only 
corroborating Maria's testimony but, more importantly, 
attributing possession and ownership of the fanny pack and its 
contents to John Martilis. 
Id. 
However, comparing their testimony shows that Ms. Nelson could not have added 
anything of significance to the story told by Ms. Coy. First, contrary to defendant's 
assertion, there is nothing to suggest Ms. Nelson would have identified the pack deputies 
found in the Corvette as the same pack her boyfriend was supposedly carrying. She was 
never asked this question during the preliminary hearing, so it is impossible to know how 
she would have responded. Moreover, the issue defendant wanted to raise about the 
ownership of the fanny pack came into evidence through Ms. Coy, who testified that the 
pack deputies found resembled the pack John was carrying, thus raising doubts about 
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whether the pack and its contents belonged to defendant (R. 99:248). On this theory, the 
identity of the actual owner of the pack was irrelevant, so long as the real owner is not 
defendant. Thus, Ms. Nelson would have added nothing of substance and her testimony 
would have been cumulative. United States v. Click 710 F.2d 639, 644 (10th Cir. 1983) 
("Counsel is not inadequate in failing to call witness whose testimony would only have 
been cumulative in nature"). 
Additionally, there are several possible reasons for trial counsel's strategic 
decision to call Ms. Coy as a witness. First, Ms. Coy provides information to which Ms. 
Nelson never testified. For example, Ms. Nelson had not testified as to who owned the 
Corvette or that defendant had borrowed the car to help Ms. Coy decide whether to 
purchase it. Ms. Coy was also able to state that her encounter with Ms. Nelson and John 
happened the day before defendant took the Corvette, which helped substantiate the 
defense theory that the fanny pack and the drugs belonged to John and were inadvertently 
left in the car without defendant's knowledge. 
It is also very clear from a review of the two women's testimony that Ms. Coy is a 
more credible witness. Her answers are clear, succinct and confident; in fact, she is 
consistent and unequivocal in her recollection of the events, despite the prosecutor's 
persistent questions (see, e.g., R. 99:258-59). By contrast, Ms. Nelson's responses are 
confusing, convoluted and tangential almost to the point of incoherence. The following 
exchange is representative: 
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Q Okay. Did he [John] - when he came back to the gas station, did he pick up 
his fanny pack? 
A That's when [inaudible] he didn't even go into the gas station. He got out, 
looked like he was going to, and then he got into the back seat and she was 
inside. He got in the back seat and he has this thing with like grabbing me 
right here, not like this part but like right here on my throat and so I think 
that's why he got in the back seat was to do that. Well, I was kind of mad at 
him. I was thinking of revenge type thing, but also because I didn't want 
my kids around that bad [inaudible] going where my kids were at. So I just 
- when I finally had enough of if [inaudible] against me and I side-tracked 
him when he was choking me, I pushed him back kind of with my foot, 
found his like I jammed it up in the passenger seat, I jammed it and I 
jammed it and I jammed it and I think [inaudible] also wanted to get him 
back [inaudible] I don't know what was in it, but it was enough to piss him 
off. I know that. 
(R. 100:33). 
Moreover, and despite defendant's claim that Ms. Nelson had no motive to perjure 
herself on defendant's behalf (Br. Aplt. at 10), it is clear from her testimony that her 
relationship with John had been stormy and sometimes violent, as demonstrated by his 
assault on her in the back seat of the Corvette (R. 100:30, 33). She even states at one 
point that she was considering some kind of revenge against John because of the assault 
(R. 100:33). Ms. Nelson also stated that she was afraid of John because of his drug use 
and that she did not want him around their children (R. 100:31). Thus, although Ms. 
Nelson apparently had no bias in favor of defendant, she did have a motive to connect her 
abusive boyfriend with the drugs found in the vehicle. 
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III. DEFENDANT HAS NOT DEMONSTRATED THAT 
THE RESULT OF HIS TRIAL WOULD HAVE BEEN 
DIFFERENT IF MS. NELSON HAD TESTIFIED. 
Even if defendant could demonstrate that his trial counsel's performance was 
deficient - which he clearly has not - he still must show that "there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding 
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. "A reasonable probability is that 
which is sufficient to undermine the confidence in the reliability of the outcome." Tyler, 
850 P.2d at 1258, Defendant cannot meet this burden. 
The State had the burden to establish the defendant knowingly possessed the drugs 
and the paraphernalia. The State may meet this burden by proving either actual 
possession or "constructive possession." State v. Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 
1987). "In order to prove constructive possession, there must be a nexus between the 
accused and the drug sufficient enough to allow an inference that the accused had both 
the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drug." State v. Salas, 
820 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App.1991) (citation omitted). "A sufficient nexus is not 
established by mere 6[o]wnership and/or occupancy of the premises upon which the drugs 
[were] found . . .especially when occupancy is not exclusive.'" Id. at 1388. 
When drugs are found in premises that are not owned or occupied exclusively by 
one person, constructive possession may be established by "key factual determinations," 
such as: (1) defendant's presence at the time and place drugs were discovered in plain or 
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open view; (2) defendant's access to the drugs; (3) the proximity of defendant to the 
drugs; and (4) incriminating statements. State v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah App. 
1998) (quoting State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258, 1262 (Utah 1983)). 
These factors point toward constructive possession of the drugs by defendant. 
First, defendant was present at the time and place drugs and paraphernalia were 
discovered (R. 98:94, 99). The drugs, or at least the baggy and the meth pipe, were in 
plain view (id.). Second, he clearly had access to the drugs and paraphernalia (id.). The 
fanny pack containing the drugs was within reach on the passenger side of the vehicle (R. 
98:128). The broken glass meth pipe found in the back seat of the Corvette was also 
accessible to defendant (R. 98:94, 99). Third, there can be little dispute, based on the 
foregoing, that defendant was in close proximity to the drugs and paraphernalia found in 
the front and back seats. His proximity to the drugs and paraphernalia was most vividly 
demonstrated by the fact that his finger was bleeding profusely and that blood was 
spattered on the pipe and on the passenger side window (R. 98:96). 
Ms. Nelson's testimony would have done little, if anything, to blunt the 
overwhelming evidence that defendant constructively possessed the drugs and 
paraphernalia. As noted in section II above, Ms. Coy's testimony concerning the 
ownership of the fanny pack was more than adequate to raise the question of whehter 
the pack belonged to defendant. Thus, Ms. Nelson's testimony on this issue would have 
been largely cumulative. Additionally, Ms. Nelson's testimony would have done nothing 
15 
to diffuse some of the most damning evidence - the baggy in the front seat and the blood-
stained crystal meth pipe in the back. In fact, she had no recollection of either item when 
she testified at the preliminary hearing. Thus, even if she had testified, she would not 
have offered any explanation for the presence of these two critical pieces of evidence, 
leaving the clear implication that they belonged to defendant. 
Accordingly, even if defendant's trial counsel erred in not calling Ms. Nelson to 
testify, there is no "reasonable probability that . . . the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Because defendant can demonstrate no 
prejudice, his ineffective assistance claim must fail. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that defendant's 
conviction be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 28th day of March, 2002. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
BRETT J. DELPORTO 
Assistant Attorney General 
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